Federations among sets of Cloud Providers (CPs), whereby a set of CPs agree to mutually use their own resources to run the VMs of other CPs, are considered a promising solution to the problem of reducing the energy cost.
INTRODUCTION
Many modern Internet services are implemented as cloud applications consisting of a set of Virtual Machines (VMs) that are allocated and run on a physical computing infrastructure managed by a virtualization platform (e.g., Xen [1] , VMware [2] , etc.). These infrastructure are typically owned by a Cloud Provider (CP) (e.g., Amazon AWS, Rackspace, Windows Azure, etc.), and are located into a (set of possibly distributed) data center(s).
One of the key issues that must be faced by a CP is the reduction of its energy cost, that represents a large fraction of the total cost of ownership for physical computing infrastructures [3] . This cost is mainly due to the consumption of the physical resources that must be switched on to run the workload.
To reduce energy consumption, two techniques are therefore possible for a CP: (a) to minimize the number of hosts that are switched on by maximizing the number of VMs allocated on each physical resource (using suitable resource management techniques [4, 5] ), and (b) to use resources that consume less energy.
Cloud federations [6] , whereby a set of CPs agree to mutually use their own resources to run the VMs of other CPs, are considered to be a promising solution for the reduction of energy costs [7] as they ease the application of both techniques.
As a matter of fact, while each individual CP is bound to its specific energy provider and to the physical infrastructure it owns, a set of federated CPs may enable the usage of more flexible energy management strategies that, by suitably relocating the workload towards CPs that pay less for the energy, or that have more energy-efficient resources, may reduce the energy bill for each one of them.
In order to exploit the energy saving potential of cloud federations, it is however necessary to address the question concerning its formation. As a matter of fact, it is unreasonable to assume that a CP unconditionally joins a federation regardless of the benefits it receives, while it is reasonable to expect that it joins a federation only if this brings it a benefit.
In this paper, we address the problem of federation formation for a set of CPs, and we devise an algorithm that allows these CPs to decide whether to federate or not on the basis of the profit they receive for doing so. In our approach, each CP pays for the energy consumed by each VM, whether it belongs to its own workload or to the one of another CP, but receives a payoff (computed as discussed later) for doing so.
The algorithm we propose is based on cooperative game theory [8, 9] . In particular, we rely on hedonic games (see [10] for their definition) whereby each CP bases its decision on its own preferences. Depending on the specific operational conditions of each CP (i.e., the resource requirements of its workload, its cost of energy, the energy consumption of its physical machines, and the revenue it obtains when running each VM on these machines), different federations (each one consisting of a subset of the CPs), or even no federation at all, may be formed by the involved CPs. We call federation set the set of distinct federations formed by a set of CPs.
The algorithm we propose computes the federation set that results in the highest profit that can be achieved by a set of autonomous and selfish CPs. This derives from the fact that this algorithm ensures that all the federations formed by groups of CPs are stable, that is CPs have no incentive to leave the federation once they decide to participate.
Unlike similar proposals (e.g., [11] ), that rely on a centralized architecture in which a trusted third party computes the federation set, we adopt a distributed approach in which each CP autonomously and selfishly makes its own decisions, and the best solution emerges from these decisions without the need of synchronizing them, or to resort to a trusted third party. In this way, we avoid two drawbacks that affect existing proposals, namely the difficulty of finding a third party that is trusted by all the CPs, and the need to suspend the operations of all the CPs when the federation set is being computed.
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. In Section 2, we describe the system under study, and provide some simple motivating example. In Section 3, we present a cooperative game-theoretic model of the system under study, and show stability conditions and profit allocation strategies that provide the theoretical foundation for the distributed coalition formation algorithm, that is also presented in this section. In Section 4, we present results from an experimental evaluation to show the effectiveness of the proposed approach. In Section 5, we provide a short overview of related works. Finally, conclusions and an outlook on future extensions are presented in Section 6.
PROBLEM FORMULATION
In this section, we first formally describe the problem addressed in the paper (see Section 2.1), and then we illustrate some issues that must be properly addressed in order to properly solve it (see Section 2.2).
System Description
We consider a set of n CPs denoted by N = 1, 2, . . . , n , where each CP i is endowed with a set Hi of physical hosts. We denote as H = H1 ∪ H2 ∪ · · · ∪ Hn the set of all the hosts collectively belonging to the various CPs. These hosts are grouped into a set G of host classes according to their processor type and to the amount of physical memory they provide; all the hosts in the same class are homogeneous in terms of processor and memory size. For any h ∈ H we denote by g(h) the function that gives the host class of h (i.e., a function g : H → G).
As discussed in [12] , we assume that a host h consumes C min g(h) Watts when its CPU is in the idle state, C max g(h) Watts when its CPU is fully utilized, and
when a fraction f ∈ [0, 1] of its CPU capacity is used. This model, albeit simple, has been shown to provide accurate estimates of power consumption for different host types when running several benchmarks representative of real-world applications [12] .
Physical hosts run cloud workloads, consisting in a set J = J1 ∪ J2 ∪ · · · ∪ Jn of VMs, where Ji denotes the set of VMs that compose the workload of the i-th CP (each VM contains the whole execution environment of one or more applications).
As typically done by CPs, VMs are grouped into a set Q of VM classes according to the computing capacity provided by their virtual processors, and to the amount of physical memory they are equipped with; all the VMs belonging to the same class provide the same amount of computing capacity and of physical memory. For instance, Amazon's EC2 [13] defines the Elastic Compute Unit (ECU) as an abstract computing resource able to deliver a capacity equivalent to that of a 1.2 GHz 2007 Xeon processor, and provides various instance types (that are equivalent to our VM classes) that differ among them in the number of ECUs and in the amount of RAM they are equipped with. More specifically, small, medium, and large, corresponding to VM class 1, 2, and 3, respectively, provide 1 ECU and 1.7 GB of RAM, 2 ECUs and 3.7 GB of RAM, and 4 ECUs and 7.5 GB of RAM, respectively.
For any VM j ∈ J , we denote by q(j) the function that gives its VM class (i.e., a function q : J → Q). Using this notation, for any j ∈ J we denote by CPU q(j) and by RAM q(j) the amount of computing capacity and of physical memory of VM j, respectively. As an example, in the Amazon EC2 case we have that CPU 1 = 1 ECU and RAM 1 = 1.7 GB, while CPU 3 = 4 ECU and RAM 3 = 7.5 GB.
When allocated on a physical host h, a VM j uses a certain fraction A q(j),g(h) of CPU capacity and a certain fraction M q(j),g(h) of physical memory. A q(j),g(h) can be determined by measuring, with a suitable benchmark (e.g., GeekBench [14] ), the computing capacity Cap v delivered by the virtual processor of VMs in q(j) and the capacity Cap p delivered by the physical processor of hosts in g(h), and then by dividing these quantities, i.e.,
For instance, if Cap v = 1, 000 and Cap p = 8, 000, then
. Each CP i charges, for each VM j, a revenue rate (that depends on the class q(j) of that VM) that specifies the amount of money that the VM owner must correspond per unit of time. For instance, Amazon charges 0.08 $/hour, 0.16 $/hour, and 0.32 $/hour for small, medium, and large instances, respectively. Consequently, CP i earns a global revenue rate that is given by the sum of the revenue rates of individual VMs. To run its workload, CP i incurs an energy cost quantified by the energy cost rate (the amount of money that is paid per unit of time), which is the energy cost resulting from the allocation of (a subset of) the workload J on its host set Hi that must be paid per unit of time (see Section 3.3 for a discussion on the optimization technique we use to minimize it). We define the net profit rate of CP i as the difference between its global revenue rate (obtained for hosting a set of VMs) and its global energy cost rate (that it incurs to run such VMs).
Our goal is to allocate all the VMs in J on the hosts in H (independently from the corresponding CPs) in such a way to maximize the net profit rate of each CP i. This goal can be achieved by finding the smallest set of hosts that are sufficient to accommodate the resource shares of all the VMs in J such that the overall energy consumption is minimized, and by providing a suitable revenue for those CPs that host VMs belonging to other CPs.
Issues in coalition formation
The most straightforward way to form a coalition 1 is to include in it all the CPs (the grand coalition). This solution is certainly attractive because of its simplicity and ease of implementation, and can bring significant benefits to its participant.
To illustrate, let us consider three different CPs, named CP1, CP2, and CP3, whose operational scenarios are characterized by the values shown in Table 1 , where we report the characteristics of the host classes (Table 1(a) ), of the VM classes (Table 1(b)), and the resource shares of each VM class (Table 1(c)). Assume, for the moment, that we have both a way to compute the set of hosts that must be switched on to minimize energy consumption (a suitable optimization problem is presented in Section 3.3), and a profit distribution rule that yields suitable revenues to CPs hosting external VMs, so that the minimization of the energy consumption within a federation of CPs corresponds to the maximization of their net profit rates (such a rule is discussed in Section 3.1). Now, let us consider a simple scenario (that we name Scenario 1) in which each CP owns 30 hosts of a single class, and in particular that CP1, CP2, and CP3 own only class-1, class-2, and class-3 hosts, respectively; furthermore, all the CPs have the same workload (in particular, each CP has to allocate 10 class-3 VMs) and energy cost (0.4 $/kWh).
If each CP uses only its own resources and allocate its own workload (i.e., no federation is formed), it achieves the energy cost rate reported in Table 2 (a), where also the total cost rate is reported. If, conversely, they form a grand coalition (i.e, they jointly perform a global workload allocation using the union of their respective host sets), their corresponding individual and overall energy cost rates are reported in Table 2 (b).
As can be seen from these results, the grand coalition yields a smaller total cost rate of energy that, as discussed before in Section 2.1, corresponds to a larger net profit rates for the individual CPs. In particular, the overall energy cost rate is reduced by 28% (from 3.96 $/hour to 2.85 $/hour), thanks to the fact that in the federation case only the hosts belonging to CP1 are used to run all the VMs.
Given the benefits resulting from the grand coalition in this example, it is natural to speculate whether the problem of computing a federation set really arises in practice.
Unfortunately, as shown below, there are cases when the grand coalition does not represent the best solution for all the involved CPs. Indeed, consider another scenario (that we name Scenario 2) where the characteristics of the hosts and of the VMs are the same as before (see Table 3 ), but the number and type of hosts and VMs differ from those assumed in Scenario 1. In particular, now CP1 owns 42 class-2 hosts and its workload consists in 65 class-2 VMs, while CP2 and CP3 own 41 class-3 hosts each and both have 61 class-2 VMs as workload.
The individual and overall energy cost rates corresponding to the optimal solution for the no federation and the grand coalition cases are reported in Table 3 (a) and (b), respectively. Again, we observe a reduction of the energy cost in the grand coalition case (seeTable 3(a) and (b)), although this reduction is smaller than in the Scenario 1 case (it amounts to 11.4%). However, by looking at the results in Table 3 (c), we can observe that if CP1 and CP2 federate among them and exclude CP3, their overall energy consumption rate is smaller than in the case of the grand coalition, although the overall cost involving all three CPs is higher. As a matter of fact, in the grand coalition the joint cost rate of CP1 and CP2 amounts to 7.89 + 3.97 = 11.86 $/hour, while in the sub-coalition case it amounts to 8.08 $/hour. This means that CP1 and CP2 have an incentive to leave the grand coalition (in case it has been formed) and to form a federation including only them or, said in game-theoretic words, the grand coalition is unstable (we discuss this concept in Section 3).
This example shows that a more sophisticated solution than simply forming the grand coalition is necessary in order to ensure stability and that, as a general rule, the resulting federation set may include several federations.
THE COOPERATIVE CP GAME
As illustrated in the previous section, a CP must consider various factors before deciding whether to join or not a federation. Among them, the most important ones are:
• Stability: a federation is stable if none of its participants finds that it is more profitable to leave it (e.g., to stay alone or to join another federation) rather than cooperating with the other ones.
• Fairness: when joining a federation, a CP expects that the resulting profits are fairly divided among participants. As unfair division leads to instability, it is necessary to design an allocation method that ensures fairness.
In this section, we model the problem of coalition formation as a coalition formation cooperative game with transferable utility [8, 9] , where each CP cooperates with the other ones in order to maximize its net profit rate, and we present a distributed algorithm for solving this problem.
Characterization
Given a set N = {1, 2, . . . , n} of CPs (henceforth also referred to as the players), a coalition S ⊆ N represents an agreement among the CPs in S to act as a single entity (i.e., S is a federation of CPs). Specifically, in this paper, a coalition S implies that the CPs belonging to S perform a global allocation of their joint workload JS by using as host set the union HS of their host sets. In other words, the CPs of the coalition act as a single CP with a load that is the composition of the loads and with a host set that is a composition of the host sets of the coalition.
A coalition S is associated with a revenue rate r JS and with an energy cost rate e JS , HS . The revenue rate of S is simply the sum of revenue rates of individual VMs j ∈ JS, while e JS, HS can be derived by minimizing the energy cost resulting from the allocation of the workload JS on the host set HS (we discuss this in Section 3.3).
We model the system under study by using the most common form of cooperative games, i.e., the characteristic form [8] , where the value of a coalition S depends solely on the members of that coalition, with no dependence on how the players in N \ S are structured (where N \ S denotes the set difference).
Given the above definitions, for the system under study we define the coalition value v(·) as:
where q(j) is the class of VM j (see Section 2.1).
The value v S must be divided, according to a given rule, among the participants to S. The share xi(S) of v S received by CP i is its payoff, and the vector x(S) ∈ IR |N | , with each component xi(S) being the payoff of CP i ∈ S, is the payoff allocation.
In our cooperative game, CPs seek to form coalitions in order to increase their payoffs. As discussed at the beginning of this section, payoffs should be fairly allocated so that stable coalitions can form.
In order to ensure fairness in the division of payoffs, we use the Shapley value [15] , a solution method that is based on the concept of marginal contribution.
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In particular, the Shapley value of player i can be defined as:
where the sum is over all subsets S not containing i. It is important to note that since the Shapley value for a player is based on the concept of the player's marginal contribution to a coalition (i.e., the change in the worth of a coalition when the player joins to that coalition), the larger is the contribution provided by a player to the coalition, the higher is the payoff allocated to it. This means that, in a given CP federation, some "more-contributing" CP will be rewarded by other "less-contributing" CPs to be enrolled in the federation.
Let us now discuss the stability. In game theory, a typical way to guarantee stability is to ensure that the allocation of payoffs falls in the so called core [8] , that can be intuitively defined as the set of payoff allocations that guarantees that no group of players has an incentive to leave the coalition N to form another coalition S ⊂ N . It can be shown that a game with a non-empty core contains allocations that can be voluntarily agreed by all players and are thereby stable, while in a game with an empty core, some players (or groups of players) are better off when acting alone than when cooperating all together (the grand coalition N ).
Unfortunately, it can be shown that the core of cooperative CP game defined above can be empty (see Section A for a formal proof of this statement).
To illustrate the effects of a game with an empty core, we return to the Scenario 2 example of Section 2.2, and we compute the coalition values and payoffs corresponding to all the federations that can be formed by the three involved CPs.
From these values, that are tabulated in Table 4 , we note that for the grand coalition we have that φ1(v) + φ2(v) = 11.79, while for the smaller coalition {1, 2} it results that v {1, 2} = 12.08. That is, for CP1 and CP2, the coalition {1, 2} is more convenient than the grand coalition, or, in other words, the grand coalition is unstable. More formally, we can prove that, for the Scenario 2, the core is empty by simply solving the optimization problem shown in Figure 1 , which directly derives from the definition of the core (e.g., see [8] ), to find one of the imputations (if any) inside the core. This optimization problem is infeasible (i.e., it does not exist any payoff vector (x0, x1, x2) that satisfies the core conditions) and hence the core is empty. These results thus confirm the intuition provided in Section 2.2, i.e., that in some situations the grand coalition may lead to instability.
It is important to note that, in general, the emptiness of the core does not depend on the particular payoff allocation strategy, but it is instead a peculiarity of the game. In order to solve this problem, we have thus to resort to The optimization model to test the emptiness of the core for the Scenario 2 a specific type of cooperative game, the so called coalition formation cooperative game (see [18, 19, 9] ) that, as shown later, achieves stability by forming independent and disjoint smaller coalitions when the grand coalition does not form (as in the Scenario 2 case discussed above).
More specifically, we consider a class of coalition formation games known as hedonic games [10, 19] . Hedonic games can be seen as special cases of cooperative games where a player's preferences over coalitions depend only on the composition of his coalition. That is, players prefer being in one coalition rather than in another one purely based on who else is in the coalitions they belong.
Let us reformulate our cooperative CP game as a hedonic game. Given the set N = {1, 2, . . . , n} of players (i.e., CPs), we define a coalition partition as the set Π = {S1, S2, . . . , S l } that partitions the CPs' set N . That is, for k = 1, . . . , l, each S k ⊆ N is a disjoint coalition such that l k=1 S k = N and Sj ∩ S k = ∅ for j = k. Given a coalition partition Π, for any CP i ∈ N , we denote by SΠ(i) the coalition S k ∈ Π such that i ∈ S k .
To set up the coalition formation process, we need to define a preference relation so that each CP can order and compare all the possible coalitions it belongs and hence it can build preferences over them. Formally, for any CP i ∈ N , a preference relation i is defined as a complete, reflexive, and transitive binary relation over the set of all coalitions that CP i can form (see [10] ). Specifically, for any CP i ∈ N and given S1, S2 ⊆ N , the notation S1 i S2 means that CP i prefers being a member of S1 over S2 or at least i prefers both coalitions equally. The strict counterpart of i is denoted by ≻i and implies that i strictly prefers being a member of S1 over S2. Note that the definition of a preference relation is one of the peculiarities of the coalition formation process. In general, this relation can be a function of several parameters, such as the payoffs that the players receive from each coalition, the approval of the coalition members, and the players' history, just to name a few.
In our coalition formation CP game, for any CP i ∈ N , we use the following preference relation:
where S1, S2 ⊆ N are two coalitions containing CP i, and fi(·) is a preference function, defined for any CP i ∈ N and any coalition S containing i, such that:
where xi(S) is the payoff received by CP i in S, and h(i) is a history set where CP i stores the identity of the coalition that it visited and left in the past. The rationale behind the use of h(·) is to avoid that a CP visit the same set of coalitions twice (a similar idea has also been used in previously published work, such as in [20, 21] ). Thus, according to Eq. (5), each CP prefers to join to the coalition that provides the larger payoff, unless it has already been visited and left in the past. The strictly counterpart ≻i of i is defined by replacing ≥ with > in Eq. (4).
A Distributed Coalition Formation Algorithm
We are now ready to define our distributed algorithm for coalition formation that allows each player to decide in a selfish way to which coalitions to join at any point in time.
This algorithm is based on the following hedonic shift rule (see [22] ): given a coalition partition Π = {S1, . . . , S l } on the set N and a preference relation ≻i, any CP i ∈ N decides to leave its current coalition SΠ(i) and join another coalition S k ∈ Π∪∅ (with S k = SΠ(i)) if and only if S k ∪{i} ≻i SΠ(i).
The shift rule can be seen as a selfish decision made by a CP to move from its current coalition to a new one, regardless of the effects of this move on the other CPs.
Whenever a CP i applies this rule, it updates its history set h(i) to store the coalition SΠ(i) it is leaving. After the rule is applied, the partition Π changes into a new partition Π ′ , such that:
Using the hedonic shift rule and the preference relation defined in Eq. (4) and Eq. (5), we construct a distributed coalition formation algorithm, shown in Figure 2 .
To implement the proposed algorithm in a real environment, a suitable approach must be taken. For a centralized approach, CPs can rely to a central coordinator, to which CPs communicate their decisions and from which CPs obtain information to update their local state. For what regards a distributed approach, suitable techniques for neighbor discovering, communication and synchronization must be used. To this end, well-known algorithms exist in distributed and multi-agent systems literature (e.g., see [23, 24] ).
It is worth noting that the presented algorithm can be executed at specific instants of time or when new VM requests arrive to CPs, thus making our coalition formation mechanism able to adapt to environmental changes.
Step 0: Initialization. At time t = 0, the CPs are partitioned as:
Step 1: Coalition Formation Stage I. Given the current coalition partition Πc, each CP i investigates possible hedonic shift operations, in order to look for a coalition S k ∈ Πc ∪ ∅ (if any) such that:
Step 2: Coalition Formation Stage II. If such coalition S k is found, CP i decides to perform the hedonic shift rule to move to S k :
1. CP i updates its history h(i) by adding S Πc (i).
2. CP i leaves its current coalition S Πc (i) and joins the new coalition S k . 3. Πc is updated:
Otherwise, CP i remains in the same coalition so that:
Step 3: Coalition Formation Stage III.
Repeat Step 1 and
Step 2 until all CPs converge to a final partition Π f .
Figure 2: The Distributed Coalition Formation Algorithm
We now prove that our algorithm always converges to a stable partition.
Proposition 1. Starting from any initial coalition structure Π0, the proposed algorithm always converges to a final partition Π f .
Proof. The coalition formation phase can be mapped to a sequence of shift operations. That is, according to the hedonic shift rule, every shift operation transforms the current partition Πc into another partition Πc+1. Thus, starting from the initial step, the algorithms yields the following transformations:
where the symbol → denotes the application of a shift operation. Every application of the shift rule generates two possible cases: (a) S k = ∅, so it leads to a new coalition partition, or (b) S k = ∅, so it yields a previously visited coalition partition with a non-cooperatively CP (i.e., with a coalition of size 1). In the first case, the number of transformations performed by the shift rule is finite (at most, it is equal to the number of partitions, that is the Bell number; see [25] ), and hence the sequence in Eq. (7) will always terminate and converge to a final partition Π f . In the second case, starting from the previously visited partition, at certain point in time, the non-cooperative CP must either join a new coalition and yield a new partition, or decide to remain non-cooperative. From this, it follows that the number of re-visited partitions will be limited, and thus, in all the cases the coalition formation stage of the algorithm will converge to a final partition Π f .
We address the stability of the final partition Π f by using the concept of Nash-stability (see [10] ). Intuitively, a partition Π is considered Nash-stable if no CP has incentive to move from its current coalition SΠ(i) to join a different coalition of Π, or to act alone. More formally, a partition
Let us show that the partition to which our algorithm converges is Nash-stable.
Proposition 2. Any final partition Π f resulting from the algorithm presented in Figure 2 is Nash-stable.
Proof. To show this, we use the proof by contradiction technique. Assume that the final partition Π f is not Nashstable. Consequently, there exists a CP i ∈ N and a coalition S k ∈ Π f ∪ ∅ such that S k ∪ {i} ≻i SΠ f (i). Then, CP i will perform a hedonic shift operation and hence Π f → Π ′ f . This contradicts the assumption that Π f is the final outcome of our algorithm.
The Nash-stability also implies the so called individual-stability (see [10] ). A partition Π = {S1, . . . , S l } is individually-stable if do not exist a player i ∈ N and a coalition S k ∈ Π ∪ ∅ such that S k ∪ {i} ≻i SΠ(i) and S k ∪ {i} j S k for all j ∈ S k .
It is worth noting that Nash-stability only captures the notion of stability with respect to movements of single CPs (i.e., no CP has an incentive to unilaterally deviate). However, it does not guarantee the stability with respect to other aspects that are instead captured by other stability concepts. For instance, the stability with respect to movements of groups of CPs is captured by the core-stability (see [10] ), whereby no group of CPs can collectively defect and form a new coalition where each of them is better off. Unfortunately, the two stability concepts are not related each other, in general (i.e., one stability concept does not necessarily imply the other one). Moreover, there exist other stronger stability concepts but unfortunately there is not warranty that a satisfying partition does exist (e.g., see [26] ) and the check for the existence is computationally hard (e.g., see [27] ). Finally, Nash-stability does not guarantee the maximization of the overall net profit (e.g., the social optimum in the game-theoretic jargon) [28] . Thus, we can conclude that our algorithm always converges to a partition Π f which is both Nash-stable and individually stable. Despite all of that, Nash-stability is generally considered a reasonable trade-off.
Computation of the Coalition Value
To use the game-theoretic model discussed in the previous section, we need a way to find (for a given coalition) the optimal workload allocation (i.e., the allocation that minimizes the energy cost), that allows us to compute the coalition value.
To this end, we define a Mixed Integer Linear Program (MILP) modeling the problem of allocating a set JS of VMs onto a set HS of hosts so that the hourly energy cost is minimized.
We base our MILP on the model described in [29] , that has been first revised to improve its computational performance and then extended in order to incorporate the heterogeneity of physical resources and the energy cost. The resulting optimization model is shown in Figure 3 , where we use the same notation introduced in Section 2.1, 3 and we denote with Ei the hourly cost (in $/Wh) of the energy consumed by a host belonging to CP i ∈ S, and with c(h) the function that gives the CP that owns host h (i.e, a function c : H → N ). Note that the electricity cost can vary with each CP.
In the optimization model we define, for any VM j ∈ J and host h ∈ H, the following decision variables: b jh is a binary variable that is equal to 1 if VM j is allocated to host h; α h is a real variable representing the overall fraction of CPU allocated to all VMs allocated on the host h; p h is a binary variable that is equal to 1 if the host h is powered on. The objective function e J , H (hereafter, e for short) represents, for a specific assignment of decision variables, the hourly energy cost (in $/hour) due to the power consumption induced by the federation of CPs to host the given VMs.
The resulting VM allocation is bound to the following constraints:
The VM allocation optimization model
• Eq. (8b) imposes that each VM is hosted by exactly one host;
• Eq. (8c) states that only hosts that are switched on can have VMs allocated to them; the purpose of these constraints is to avoid that a VM is allocated to a host that will be powered off;
• Eq. (8d) ensures that (1) the CPU resource of a poweredon host is not exceeded, and (2) that no CPU resource is consumed on a host that will be powered off;
• Eq. (8e) assures that (1) the RAM resource of a poweredon host is not exceeded, (2) that VMs hosted on that host receive their required amount of RAM, and (3) that no RAM resource is consumed on a host that will be powered off;
• Eq. (8f) states that all VMs must exactly obtain the amount of CPU resource they require;
• Eq. (8g), Eq. (8h), and Eq. (8i) define the domain of decision variables b ih , α h , and p h , respectively.
As in [29] , in order to keep into considerations QoS requirements related to each class of VMs, we assumed that each VM j exactly obtains the amount of CPU CPU q(j) and RAM RAM q(j) as defined by its class q(j) (see Section 2.1).
EXPERIMENTAL EVALUATION
To illustrate the effectiveness of our algorithm for coalition formation, we perform a set of experiments in which we compute the federation set for various scenarios including a population of distinct CPs.
In all scenarios, we consider 4 CPs, whose infrastructures are characterized as reported in Table 5 , and we use the same host classes, VM classes and VM shares as the ones defined in Table 1 . We also assume that all CPs use the same revenue rate policy, that is they earn 0.08 $/hour for For each one the above scenario, we compute the federation set of the involved CPs by using an ad-hoc simulator written in C++ and interfaced with CPLEX [30] to solve the various instances of the optimization model of Section 3.3.
In the rest of this section, we first present a summary of the performance obtained by our algorithm over all scenarios, and then, we illustrate its behavior by showing its run trace for one of these scenarios.
In Figure 4 , we compare the performance of each scenario in terms of energy saving and net profit obtained with our algorithm with respect to the no-federation case (i.e., when CPs work in isolation). Specifically, the figures show, for each scenario, the percentage of the reduction of energy consumption (see Figure 4a ) and of the increment of net profit (see Figure 4b ) that all CPs obtain when they federate according to our algorithm with respect to the case of working individually. As can be seen from the figures, our algorithm, with respect to always work non-cooperatively, allows the CPs to reduce the overall consumed energy from 9.4% to 38% (with an average of 21.7%), and to increment the overall net profit from 5.6% to 30.3% (with an average of 13.2%).
We can also analyze the benefits provided by our algorithm from the point of view of each CP. Results from our experiments show that, from the CP perspective, the formation of federations yielded by our algorithm is always nondetrimental. Specifically, it results that, on average, the net profit earned by CP1, CP2, CP3 and CP4 increases by nearly 22%, 12%, 27% and 6% with respect to the no-federation case, respectively.
Finally, to illustrate how our algorithm works, we present the run trace for a single scenario, whose characteristics are reported in Table 6 . We select this scenario to illustrate the behavior of the algorithm when there are multiple Nashstable partitions.
For this investigation, we show in Table 7 all possible par- • Sequence #2: {1}, {2}, {3}, {4}
where the index on top of each arrow denotes the CP that performs the corresponding hedonic shift rule.
Regardless what partition is finally selected, from the third column of Table 7 we can also observe that, for this scenario, the partition value improvement for both the Nash-stable partitions with respect to the non-cooperative behavior (i.e., partition {1}, {2}, {3}, {4} ) is about 9%.
RELATED WORKS
Recently, the concept of cloud federations [6, 31] has been proposed as a way to provide individual CPs with more flexibility when allocating on-demand workloads. Existing work on cloud federations has been mainly focused on the development of architectural models for federations [32] , and of mechanisms providing specific functionalities (e.g., workload management [33, 34] , accounting and billing [35] , and pricing [36, 37, 38, 39] ).
To the best of our knowledge, very little work has been carried out to jointly tackle the problem of dynamically forming stable cloud federations for energy-aware resource provisioning. Indeed, much of the existing work only focuses on a single aspect of the problem. In [40] , the design and implementation of a VM scheduler for a federation of CPs is presented. The scheduler, in addition to manage resources that are local to each CP, is able to decide when to rent resources from other CPs, when to lease own idle resources to other CPs, and when to turn on or off local physical resources. Unlike our work, this work does not consider the problem of forming stable CP federations. In [41] , a cooperative game-theoretic model for federation formation and VM management is proposed. In this work, the federation formation among CPs is analyzed using the concept of network games, but the energy minimization problem is not considered.
In [11] , a profit-maximizing game-based mechanism to enable dynamic cloud federation formation is proposed. The dynamic federation formation problem is modeled as a hedonic game (like our approach), and the federations are computed by means of a merge-split algorithm. There are several important differences between this and our works: (1) we propose a decentralized algorithm, (2) we demonstrate the stability of the obtained federations, and (3) we use the 
In [43] , the problem of sharing unused capacity in a federation of CPs for VM spot market is formulated as a noncooperative repeated game. Specifically, by using a Markov model to predict future non-spot workload, the authors introduce a set of capacity sharing strategies that maximize the federation's long-term revenue and propose a dynamic programming algorithm to find the allocation rules needed to achieve it. Our work can complement this approach by providing a solution to the formation of CP federations for non-spot VM instances.
CONCLUSIONS AND FUTURE WORKS
This paper investigates a novel dynamic federation scheme among a set of Cloud Providers (CPs). To this end, we propose a cooperative game-theoretic framework to study the federation formation problem, and a mathematical optimization model to allocate CP workload in an energy-aware fashion, in order to reduce CP energy costs.
In the proposed scheme, we model the cooperation among the CPs as a coalition game with transferable utility and we devise a distributed hedonic shift algorithm for coalition formation. With the proposed algorithm, each CP individually decides whether to leave the current coalition to join a different one according to his preference, meanwhile improving the perceived net profit. Furthermore, we prove that the proposed algorithm converges to a Nash-stable partition which determines the resulting coalition structure. Numerical results show the effectiveness of our approach.
The future developments of this research is following several directions. First of all, we would like to enhance the coalition value function in order to account for possible request losses due to lack of physical resources. Furthermore, we want to improve the game-theoretic and optimization models in order to consider the cost of migration of VMs from one CP to another (both in terms of energy and loss of revenues) as well as other aspects like the ones related to trustworthiness among CPs.
As a second research direction, we plan to investigate the relation among different stability definitions, and in particular the relation between the Nash-stability and the corestability (see [44] ). In general, these stability definitions are not related. However, there can be special cases where these stability concepts hold simultaneously. Similar results appeared in [45] .
Finally, we plan to integrate the long-term resource provisioning solution proposed in this paper with other shortterm and medium-term resource management strategies (e.g., [5, 46] ) to improve resource utilization and meet applicationlevel performance requirements, and with techniques for incremental VM migration (e.g., [47] ).
APPENDIX A. THE CORE OF THE COOPERATIVE CP GAME CAN BE EMPTY
In this section, we present a more formal proof of the possible emptiness of the core of the cooperative CP game defined in Section 3.1. To do so, we use the proof by construction technique, by providing an instance of the game for which In cooperative game theory, the Bondareva-Shapley theorem provides the necessary and sufficient conditions for the nonemptiness of the core solution concept [8] . S∈2 N : i∈S α S = 1 the following condition holds:
We now show that for the cooperative CP game there exists at least one counterexample that violates the conditions Eq. (9) of the Bondareva-Shapley theorem.
Let us consider a simple scenario consisting of the same host and VM classes as defined in Section 2.2, and of three CPs, whose characteristics are reported in Table 8 .
We build the cooperative CP game N , v where N = {1, 2, 3} is the set of CPs and v(·) is the same characteristic function defined in Eq. (1). In Table 9 , we show the enumeration of all possible CP coalitions for this game along with their values. To compute the coalition value we use the same revenue rate described in Section 4, that is 0.08 $/hour for class-1 VMs, 0.16 $/hour for class-2 VMs, and 0.32 $/hour for class-3 VMs. which clearly violates the conditions Eq. (9) of the BondarevaShapley theorem and hence the core for this game is empty.
